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86 
CRASH TEST DUMMIES:  
WHAT DRIVES AUTOMOBILE SAFETY 
IN THE UNITED STATES? 
 
Joseph Gavin* 
 
nvented at the end of America’s gilded age nearly 125 years 
ago, the automobile has grown up with this country, not only 
facilitating our industries and growth but also becoming an 
inextricable element of our cultural identity. Early innovators like 
Henry Ford helped transform what was once a novel luxury into 
an affordable and eventually ubiquitous tool. As of 2008, 
approximately 256 million vehicles were registered in the United 
States.1 While consumers tend to focus on safety, quality, and 
performance when evaluating which car to purchase, few people 
pay further attention to car safety once it leaves the dealer’s lot. 
In reality, every time an individual gets in a car, they are 
entrusting their safety to the design and function of the vehicle. 
They are dependent not just on the owner’s successful 
maintenance, but also on the bumpers, seatbelts, airbags and 30 
or more on-board computers. 
Fortunately, there are forces beyond the attentive vehicle 
maintainer and the altruistic manufacturers that are constantly 
working behind the scenes to make us safer on the roads. There 
are three aspects of consumer culture that each claim credit for 
the development of auto safety in the U.S. Broadly, these 
elements include regulation, litigation and manufacturer 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, 2013, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A., 
2007, Kenyon College. The author would like to thank Kathryn Tumen and 
the rest of his family for their guidance and support. He would also like to 
thank all of the editors and staff of the Loyola Consumer Law Review, 
particularly Leslie Cornell and Jack Benge, for their hard work on this 
publication.  
 1 RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 
STATISTICS, TABLE 1-11: NUMBER OF U.S. AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES, VESSELS 
AND OTHER CONVEYANCES (2009). 
I 
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accountability. This note will evaluate these three parties and 
their role in auto safety and additionally uncover a hidden fourth 
enforcer who is essential to the success of the other three.   
Finally, this note will discuss the relevance of the 
automotive safety technology currently on the horizon in this 
country and conclude by addressing the relative safety of 
subcompact vehicles popular in Europe and whether these cars 
will ever find favor in America. 
I. THE SOURCES OF SAFETY 
A.  The Historical Context of the Movement for Automobile 
Safety 
For the first half-century of the automobile’s existence, 
automotive safety was rarely a priority for manufacturers or the 
government. As automobiles became increasingly popular in the 
early part of the century, the federal government saw little reason 
to preempt state vehicle laws and therefore confined its 
involvement in the industry to contributions for building roads.2 
In fact, the first time the U.S. implemented legislation governing 
automobile design was not until 1940.3 
At the end of World War II, American soldiers returned 
home to a severe housing shortage, which led to a major 
suburban sprawl facilitated by the automobile, thereby increasing 
the demand for new automobiles and highways.4 Throughout the 
early and middle twentieth century, the U.S. government focused 
on injury and fatality prevention primarily through changing 
driver behavior rather than improving mechanical safety.5 
According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS):  
Engineering attracted some attention, but it was 
engineering to prevent crashes. Reducing the 
                                                          
 2  MARTIN ALBAUM, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, SAFETY SELLS: 
MARKET FORCES AND REGULATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBAGS 1 
(2005). 
 3  This legislation required all new cars to have sealed beam headlights, a 
then-recent invention. Because the law remained in effect until 1984, critics 
note the requirement actually resulted in freezing headlight innovation rather 
than promoting safety, a pattern that permeated other aspects of automotive 
safety design legislation. 
 4  ALBAUM, supra note 2, at 1. 
 5  JAMES CASTELLI, CARL NASH, CLARENCE DITLOW & MICHAEL PECHT, 
SUDDEN ACCELERATION: THE MYTH OF DRIVER ERROR 19 (2003). 
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consequences of crashes didn’t get much notice. Because 
of the focus on crash prevention, many lifesaving 
vehicle designs were overlooked. For example, a few 
physicians advocated safety belts in the 1930s, but U.S. 
automakers didn’t begin installing lap belts as standard 
equipment until the 1960s – and then in response to 
state mandates. Shoulder belts didn’t become standard 
until the 1968 model year when they were mandated by 
federal law.6  
One point to keep in mind is that during this time frame, 
the majority of the country had not yet abrogated contributory 
negligence in favor of comparative negligence. Because driver 
error or negligence was so often partially to blame in automobile 
injuries and fatalities, manufacturer liability was precluded. 
Therefore, there was little incentive for the manufacturing 
industry to investigate deeper into safety concerns.7   
There were, of course, some early advocates of automobile 
safety. For example, Hugh DeHaven, a World War I pilot, 
started the Crash Injury Research project at Cornell University 
in 1942 and later patented the first three-point seatbelt.8 Dr. 
William Haddon, Jr., another early safety advocate, applied his 
background as a public health physician and initiated the shift in 
focus from crash avoidance to crash survival.9 
In the mid-1960s, the ideas of DeHaven and Haddon 
started to gain momentum, and there was a major shift in the 
national consciousness regarding auto safety. The first impetus in 
this shift was Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-
                                                          
 6  Id. 
 7  See NHTSA Removes ‘Accident’ from Its Vocabulary, 3 INJ. 
PREVENTION 82 (1997). The government favored the no-fault word “accident” 
over “crash” until 1997. In a letter explaining the shift away from use of the 
word “accident,” NHTSA Administrator Ricardo Martinez said that the word 
“accident” worked against the idea that highway injuries and fatalities could 
be prevented; see also Robert J. Eaton, Chairman and CEO, Chrysler Corp., 
Automobile Safety: Transp., Mobility, Safety and Fun, Address Before the 
Chief Executive Club of Boston (Nov. 18, 1997), in 64 VITAL SPEECHES OF 
THE DAY 214-17, 216 (1998) (“Up and down the halls, signs were changed to 
reflect the conviction that when something goes wrong, it’s not simply an 
accident. Somebody must be at fault”). 
 8  Combination Shoulder and Lap Safety Belts, U.S. Patent No. 2,710,649 
(filed Feb. 19, 1951) (issued June 14, 1955). 
 9  CASTELLI ET AL., supra note 5, at 19; see also ALBAUM, supra note 2, at 
1. 
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In Dangers of the American Automobile, (“Unsafe at any Speed”), 
which was published in 1965.10 The book is famous for vilifying 
Chevrolet’s Corvair, which Nader referred to as “The One-Car 
Accident,” but it focused on much more than that single 
problematic model.11 It paid significant attention to the interior 
surfaces and the idea of the “second collision,” meaning the 
collision between the driver or passenger and the interior surfaces 
of the vehicle.12 Most importantly, Nader revealed how 
automobile manufacturers were generally reluctant to include 
safety features despite the awareness that these features could 
save lives.13 Complementing Nader’s informative book, the 
National Research Council issued a report the following year 
titled Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of 
Modern Society, which also served as a call to action for 
consumers to demand improvements in automotive safety.14 
In response to the growing outrage from consumers 
regarding the prevalence of preventable automobile injuries and 
fatalities, Congress unanimously passed the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (“Act”).15 The Act, signed by President 
Johnson on September 9, 1966, was designed to reduce traffic 
accidents and resulting injuries and fatalities.16 The Act was 
passed with the Highway Safety Act of 1966, which laid the 
foundation for establishing uniform standards for state highway 
safety programs.17 The powers created by these Acts were 
delegated to the administrator of a new government agency called 
the National Highway Safety Bureau, which became the 
                                                          
 10  RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS 
OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965). 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. at 86. 
 13  Following the publication of this book, GM engaged in aggressive 
tactics directed at undermining and intimidating Nader. See also Nader v. 
General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970). 
 14  COMM. ON TRAUMA AND COMM. ON SHOCK, DIV. OF MED. SCIENCES, 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACCIDENTAL 
DEATH AND DISABILITY: THE NEGLECTED DISEASE OF MODERN SOCIETY 1 
(1966). Because this report was issued in September 1966, the same month that 
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Highway Safety Act, the report is 
more important as an indicator of the changing public sentiment than as an 
impetus for the legislation. 
 15  ALBAUM, supra note 2, at 12. 
 16  THE NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT, PUB. L. 
NO. 89-563, reprinted in 1 NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY 
ACT OF 1966: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 3-15. 
 17  ALBAUM, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 
1970.18 In 1979, the NHTSA created the New Car Assessment 
Program (NCAP) which effectively rates and compares the safety 
performance of various cars, providing consumers with a 
meaningful safety rating relative to similar vehicles, thereby 
encouraging manufacturers to voluntarily improve safety 
performance.19 These steps were the first substantive attempts by 
the federal government to moderate auto safety through 
regulation. This method of reform gained significant momentum 
in the following decades and has an important effect on 
automotive safety today. 
B.  Federal Regulation 
As discussed above, the first organization controlling 
automotive safety in the United States was the NHTSA. This 
agency has a “primary mission of saving lives and preventing 
injuries associated with motor vehicle crashes.”20 The NHTSA is 
responsible for: 1) promulgating uniform standards for State 
highway safety programs; 2) improving vehicle safety by 
establishing, prescribing, and enforcing National safety 
standards; and 3) informing the public of the comparative safety 
of passenger motor vehicles on the market.21 In order to set these 
safety performance standards, the NHTSA has broad authority 
to test vehicles and conduct research as it sees fit.22 It can issue 
requests, subpoena documents or other information, conduct 
formal hearings or administrative depositions, and request special 
reports from relevant entities.23 Finally, once the NHTSA has 
                                                          
 18  Id. at 15. 
 19  DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT 
HS 810 698, THE NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM SUGGESTED APPROACHES 
FOR FUTURE PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS 3 (2007) [hereinafter NCAP 
APPROACHES]. 
 20  DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT 
HS 811 337, REPORT TO CONGRESS NHTSA’S CRASH DATA COLLECTION 
PROGRAMS at II (2010). 
 21  49 C.F.R. §1.4. (pertaining only to its direct efforts to effect new car 
safety and therefore this paper will not address efforts directed at the used car 
market. In addition, the vast power the NHTSA wields through the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations will be addressed in section III of 
this paper). 
 22  49 U.S.C. § 30168, repealed by Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 
(2012). 
 23  49 C.F.R. §510.3 (2012); 49 C.F.R. §510.7 (2012). 
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established a standard for future automobiles, it must enforce it. 
Since its creation in 1966, the NHTSA has had enormous 
success. In March 2010, agency administrator David Strickland 
told the House of Representatives, “This agency has one goal. 
That is to keep people alive and safe on the road.”24 Illustrating 
its success, Strickland reported, “the number of highway fatalities 
in 2009 – 33,963 – was the fewest since 1954.”25 This is especially 
impressive considering how many more cars and drivers are on 
the road today compared to 1954. In fact, a better illustration of 
the success of this agency is that the fatality rate per 100 million 
vehicle miles traveled was 1.16 in 2009 versus 5.5 in 1966 (and 
6.03 in 1954).26 Further bolstering the accomplishments of the 
NHTSA, as the number of vehicle miles traveled has increased 
consistently year after year, the total annual fatality number 
increased every year until 1969 when it began steadily 
decreasing.27 
The New Car Assessment Program was so successful in 
encouraging both manufacturers to design safer vehicles and 
consumers to make these demands, that the NHTSA saw fit to 
revamp the crash testing and safety rating criteria.28 Unveiled in 
October 2010, the new Government 5-Star Safety Ratings 
Program incorporates new tests, new safety rating criteria, and 
crash test dummies in new sizes that collect more data regarding 
the forces and potential injuries at the time of impact.29 As a 
result of these more rigorous tests, “vehicles that previously 
earned five stars may not continue to earn five stars—even if no 
changes have been made to the model. . .”30 In theory, these more 
stringent standards will lead to even safer vehicles. 
                                                          
 24  Jenna Greene, Toyota Troubles Shielded by Agency, 32 NAT’L 4, 5 
(2010). 
 25  Id. 
 26  DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT 
HS 811 346, AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN MOTOR VEHICLE 
TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 2008 (2010). 
 27  Id. 
 28  Lorraine Gilbert, NHTSA Rolls Out New Safety Rating System: 
Features Stiffer Tests, One Score, More Data, 38 PRODUCT SAFETY & 
LIABILITY REP. 1053, 1053 (2010). 
 29  DEP’T OF TRANSP., FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 6 (2010). 
 30  See Gilbert, supra note 28, at 1053-1054. An important component of 
this program is helping consumers make more educated decisions regarding 
safety, so the NHTSA created two simple consumer websites to explain the 
new tests: www.safercar.gov and www.newstarsoncars.com. The test 
performance information can also be found on the vehicle’s window sticker. 
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Despite these improvements, the NHTSA suffers from 
some major deficiencies, the most serious of which is funding. 
Although the Department of Transportation (DOT), which 
oversees the NHTSA, claims safety as its top priority, of the 
DOT’s budget (approximately $79 billion for FY 2011) only a 
very small percentage is allocated to the NHTSA.31 Despite the 
fact that traffic fatalities account for more than 90 percent of 
transportation-related fatalities in the United States, and motor 
vehicle crashes are the leading single cause of death for 
individuals between the ages of 4 and 34, the NHTSA’s FY 2011 
budget request was only $877.6 million.32  This was 
approximately 1.1% of the DOT budget. Furthermore, less than a 
third of the NHTSA’s already-small budget will actually go to 
safety programs.33 
These budget limitations contribute to other deficiencies in 
the NHTSA. In prepared testimony before Congress on March 
11, 2010, NHTSA administrator David Strickland reported that 
the agency receives more than 30,000 complaints annually, “and 
we review each and every one.”34 However, the NHTSA employs 
just 57 people to investigate these complaints.35 Another weak 
point for the NHTSA is the way it aggregates crash data 
provided by consumers and manufacturers. By keeping the 
information in separate databases, the NHTSA makes it more 
difficult for investigators to spot issues and for consumers to 
research and compare each model’s safety records.36 
Given these limited resources, the agency is particularly 
susceptible to harboring historical biases when determining 
                                                          
 31  DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FY 
2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 1 (2010); DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2010). 
 32  DEP’T OF TRANSP., FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 18 (2010). 
 33  Id. at 15. (NHTSA’s FY 2011 Budget Request of $877.6 million 
includes $117.4 million for Behavioral Safety, $132.8 million for Vehicle 
Safety, $676.7 million for the National Driver Register, and $620.7 million for 
State Grants, High Visibility Enforcement Support, and Grant 
Administration). 
 34  NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. & the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 111th Cong. 6 (2010). 
 35  Ken Thomas & Stephen Manning, Toyota Troubles Put Spotlight on US 
Safety Agency, CNBC.COM (Mar. 11, 2010) 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/35821504/NHTSA_Says_May_Need_More_Authorit
y_Over_Auto_Industry. 
 36  Cars Must Be Safer, CONSUMER REPORTS, May 2010, at 6. 
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whether to launch new investigations. For example, because the 
NHTSA had been unsuccessful in pinpointing the causes of 
sudden unintended acceleration in the past, particularly with 
Audi in the late 1980s, the agency was more inclined to attribute 
the problem to driver error than expend its limited resources on 
such an elusive problem.37  According to Sean Kane, a consultant 
who frequently works with plaintiff’s attorneys, in response to 
the early complaints against Toyota, “from a policy and resource 
standpoint,” the NHTSA “made a decision to walk away” as a 
result of this historical bias.38 Furthermore, although the NHTSA 
has broad powers to subpoena information from the 
manufacturers, critics note that it is a rare occasion when it 
actually invokes those rights, and the NHTSA tends “to side with 
the conclusions reached by the carmaker.”39 On the even rarer 
occasion that it does not side with the manufacturer, the 
maximum fine that the NHTSA can impose is $16.375 million, 
which is hardly even noticeable to a multi-billion dollar auto 
manufacturer, let alone a strong deterrent. 
In addition to problems related to its limited budget and 
authority, the NHTSA has been criticized as having “a culture 
where enforcement is a low priority.”40 One of the reasons for this 
may be that the agency suffers from “regulatory capture,” which 
is the idea that regulators can become overly deferential to the 
industries they are assigned to oversee, forgetting their public-
interest mission in the process.41 In fact, the NHTSA relies 
primarily on the manufacturers themselves to identify the perils 
posed by their vehicles.42 “During agency reviews, officials have 
at times minimized or simply rejected consumer accounts of what 
happened in favor of the manufacturers’ assessments, records 
                                                          
 37  See Kimberly Kindy & Peter Whoriskey, NHTSA’s Previous Car Pedal 
Safety Efforts Died, Stalled Amid Industry Opposition, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 
2011, at A12 (Audi had a major issue with sudden unintended acceleration in 
the late 1980s, and the NHTSA expended considerable resources investigating 
the issue without ever finding a definitive cause. According to E. Donald 
Sussman, one of the lead NHTSA researchers studying the complaints against 
Audi in 1989, the “NHTSA rarely requires industries to do design changes. 
They hope they will voluntarily do the right thing”). 
 38  GREENE, supra note 24, at 5. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Ben Kelley, Op-Ed, Decades Later, Still Unsafe at Any Speed, BALT. 
SUN, Feb. 7, 2011, at 6. 
 42  Peter Whoriskey, NHTSA Overly Reliant on Carmakers’ Accounts 
During Complaint Reviews, Critics Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2010, at A01. 
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show.”43 For example, Andrew Card, President George W. Bush’s 
chief of staff who had previously served as an auto industry 
lobbyist for General Motors, said: “While NHTSA staff tries to do 
a good job, they are headed up by political appointees in the 
administrative and legal counsel offices. During the 2001-2008 
era, those appointees included lawyers from GM and Chrysler . . . 
So it may be that some investigations were terminated for 
political reasons.”44 More recently, the two Toyota executives 
who convinced the NHTSA to terminate the initial investigation 
into sudden unintended acceleration, joined Toyota immediately 
after leaving the NHTSA.45 These practices bring up questions 
regarding the legitimacy of the investigations and consequently 
the protections being afforded to consumers.  
In sum, despite the NHTSA’s commendable efforts to 
improve automotive safety since 1966 as well as their statistical 
success, the agency’s limited resources and biased nature severely 
diminish its willingness and ability to identify new safety 
concerns and respond quickly and effectively. 
C.  Litigation 
The second force driving automotive safety is litigation, 
generally in the form of civil suits brought against carmakers. 
After all, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., a 1916 suit against an 
automobile manufacturer, helped shape modern product liability 
law.46 For more than half a century following that case, courts 
generally held that automobile manufacturers merely had a duty 
to construct a vehicle that was “free of latent and hidden 
defects.”47 However, as Ralph Nader highlighted in his 1965 book 
Unsafe at Any Speed, automobile manufacturers continued to 
                                                          
 43  Id. 
 44  Andrew Clevenger, W.Va. Lawsuit Targets Toyota, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE (West Virginia), January 30, 2010, at 7. 
 45  R. Graham Esdale, Jr. & Timothy R. Fiedler, Toyota’s Deadly Secrets, 
TRIAL MAG., Sept. 2010. 
 46  AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION 
SPURRED AUTO SAFETY INNOVATIONS 11 (2010); see also MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916). 
 47  See Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966) 
(holding that defendant manufacturer had no duty to construct a crash-proof 
car because collisions were not an intended purpose of the vehicle), overruled 
by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); See also Richard 
M. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 
DUKE L.J. 476, 477 (1936). 
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exhibit willful negligence in their design of vehicles they knew to 
be unsafe in collisions.48 Prior to the 1960’s, design decisions that 
valued style over safety were not only possible but even 
commonplace because courts generally only held automobile 
manufacturers liable when defects in construction resulted in 
crashes.49 Thanks in part to the growing public outrage regarding 
auto safety in the mid-1960s, the court took a hard line against 
automakers in the 1968 case Larson v. General Motors.50 In that 
case, General Motors claimed that automakers had no duty to 
manufacture a product that would be safe in collisions they had 
no direct part in causing.51 The court reasoned that collisions, 
with or without fault of the driver, were statistically inevitable, 
and therefore should be foreseeable by the manufacturer.52 The 
court imposed upon automobile manufacturers “a duty to use 
reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the 
user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.”53 
Following a trajectory set by Larson, courts continued to 
broaden the duties of manufacturers, especially over the 
15 subsequent years.  Particularly important cases include Dyson 
v. General Motors, which established that carmakers have an 
obligation to provide “a reasonably safe container within which 
to make the journey,” and Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the 
famous 1981 case involving the Ford Pinto, explained later in this 
note.54 The American Association for Justice (formerly the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America) claims that lawsuits, 
beyond merely giving victims a right to redress, provide an 
essential avenue by which manufacturers are encouraged to 
improve their products.55 Litigation is particularly important in 
                                                          
 48  See NADER, supra note 10, at 172. See also AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, 
supra note 46, at 3. 
 49  AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 3; see also Harold A. Katz, 
Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 863, 865 (1956). 
 50  See Larson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968) 
(reversing policy voiced in Evans v. General Motors Corp. 359 F.2d 822 (7th 
Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 836, 87 (1966) (holding that the risk of 
collisions was foreseeable and therefore automobile manufacturers had duty to 
design crash-worthy vehicles). 
 51  Id. at 497. 
 52  Id. at 501-502. 
 53  Id. at 504. 
 54  Dyson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F.Supp. 1064 (Pa. 1969); see also 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (4th D. 1981). 
 55  AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 3. 
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convincing automakers to redesign certain components such as 
power windows, seat belts, and tires, among other things, because 
historically the NHTSA has been averse to mandating specific 
design changes.56 
In addition, there are other less direct ways in which 
litigation spurs automobile safety, such as providing 
manufacturers with financial incentive to build safer vehicles. 
Estimates of the total annual legal expenses of auto 
manufacturers varies greatly year to year, but broad liability is 
always lurking for automakers. For example, although some of 
the Toyota unintended acceleration suits have not yet reached 
trial, one expert warned that “legal expenses and damages 
resulting from the safety defects could tack billions of dollars onto 
the $2 billion that Toyota had said it would cost the company in 
repairs and lost sales.”57 More recently, Toyota customers have 
filed  “diminished-value” lawsuits whereby Toyota could be liable 
for the diminished resale value, possibly around 4%, of the 
millions of its cars affected by the recall.58 Though diminished-
value lawsuits are notoriously difficult to prove, the economic 
damages to Toyota in such a case could exceed $3 billion.59 
Although these numbers seem impressive at first glance, 
they pale in comparison to a general manufacturer’s overall 
revenue. Even a $3 billion loss to a company like Toyota would 
not be catastrophic considering Toyota “reported more than $200 
billion in worldwide sales for the fiscal year that ended March 
2009.”60 Furthermore, these financial incentive arguments fail to 
support the idea that litigation serves as more than an expensive 
hassle. It leaves unanswered the question of whether the lawsuits 
really figure into the automakers’ design and production 
decisions. In Toyota’s case, the scandal caused the company to 
reform its management and design process in order to encourage 
better communication and more thorough engineering.61 
                                                          
 56  Id. at 5, 6, 9; See also Kindy & Whoriskey, supra note 37, at A12. 
 57  Jerry Hirsch & Stuart Pfeifer, Toyota Faces Massive Legal Liability, 
L.A.TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at 9. 
 58  Id; see also Justin Berkowitz, Unintended Depreciation: Former and 
Current Owners Suing Toyota for Lost Resale Value, Car & Driver (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2012)  http://blog.caranddriver.com/unintended-depreciation-former-
and-current-owners-suing-toyota-for-lost-resale-value/. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Mark Rechtin & Hans Greimel, How Toyota Attacked the Crisis, 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, at 10. 
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However, the Toyota scandal is the exception rather than the 
rule. Moreover, it was not litigation alone that drove the 
company to overhaul its corporate structure.  
Critics of this pro-litigation argument are quick to point 
out that manufacturers often debut safety features in European 
countries, which are vastly less litigious than the United States, 
years before installing those features on the U.S. versions of their 
cars.62 One likely explanation for this paradox is that the 
European version of the New Car Assessment Program 
(EuroNCAP) imposes tougher safety standards than the 
NHTSA.63 The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, a group 
that represents 11 automakers, likened lawyers taking credit for 
safety innovation to “the rooster taking credit for the sunrise.”64 
The group argued that in fact litigation and innovation were 
mutually exclusive and that focusing on litigation “does nothing 
to advance technology, instead it delays progress.”65 
In conclusion, although there is some truth to the claim 
that “the civil justice system, when called upon through litigation, 
spurs motor vehicle innovation and enforcement of safety 
standards,” the manufacturers make clear that other important 
and unrelated forces are also at work behind the scenes making 
this possible.66 
D.  Manufacturers and Market Forces 
The third force driving automotive safety is the 
manufacturers themselves. Not surprisingly, carmakers strongly 
disagree with the perspective that favors litigation as the main 
catalyst for changes in automotive design. Today, “automakers 
expect to be sued no matter what they do,” meaning there is an 
argument to be made that they are best served by focusing 
primarily on the design elements that will make a car sell rather 
than what would make a passenger safe.67 In the 1950s, Lee 
Iacocca, who would later go on to become president at Ford and 
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create the Pinto, famously quipped that “safety doesn’t sell.”68 
Regardless of his intent, the truth is that before the 1960s, safety 
really was not a selling point for consumers. Fortunately, that is 
no longer the case.   
The sudden flurry of interest in automotive safety that 
resulted in the creation of the NHTSA in the late 1960s repeated 
itself a decade later. As mentioned previously, in 1978 a jury 
awarded Richard Grimshaw, a driver who had been permanently 
injured in an accident in a Ford Pinto, $125 million in punitive 
damages against Ford.69 Although the damages were eventually 
scaled back significantly, Grimshaw’s case caused the public to 
take notice of the importance of automobile safety features. 
Following the creation of the NCAP in 1979, the number of 
references to safety features in automotive advertisements began 
to increase.70 The importance of safety performance really took 
off in the mid-1990s, when the NCAP introduced the five-star 
ratings system that made it easier for consumers to compare a 
vehicle’s safety performance. Beginning September 1, 2007, 
manufacturers have been required to place NCAP star ratings on 
all automobile price sticker labels.71 
Thanks to the efforts of the NHTSA and litigation, 
today’s consumers care about automotive safety, and 
manufacturers are responding appropriately. Now that safety 
sells, “no automaker wants to be seen as being behind the 
curve.”72 According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
(IIHS), automakers “have really taken the lead in the safety 
arena” since mid-2008.73 Moreover, as consumers demand the 
latest crashworthiness features and safety systems, carmakers are 
already going “far beyond what the federal government has 
required,” by developing and installing early warning systems 
and other crash-avoidance features.74 
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Despite these great advances, critics warn against giving 
the manufacturers too much credit. The nature of the safety-sells 
mentality means that the dedication to safety will only endure as 
long as consumers’ dedication to spend money on safety endures. 
Critics like Consumer Reports also warn that automakers 
frequently abuse the high demand for safety features by making 
them only available when packaged with unnecessary, high-
margin options.75 For example, the Honda Civic, which is 
consistently one of the top ten best-selling cars in the country, is 
advertised as having a base price of approximately $16,000.76 
However, in order to get a Civic with electronic stability control, 
which many critics believe is an essential safety mechanism that 
should already be standard on all cars and which typically costs 
an additional $1,500 on its own, the buyer must upgrade to the 
EX-L model.77 The EX-L has a base price of $22,000 and 
includes such unnecessary features as alloy wheels, heated seats, 
and a power sunroof.78  
Still, it appears as if manufacturers are accepting a larger 
role in the design and implementation of safer vehicles, overall. 
This is an important component of creating consistent auto 
safety, however, the manufacturers generally only respond to the 
demands of other market forces. Therefore, it is necessary that all 
of the components that drive auto safety in the U.S. continue to 
evolve and work in unison. So far, this note has discussed the 
effects of regulation, litigation and manufacturer action based on 
consumer demand, however, these enforcement mechanisms on 
their own aren’t responsible for the full power behind the 
development of safer vehicles. 
E.  Conclusions Regarding the Sources of Automotive Safety 
Although the NHTSA is crucial in creating the long-term 
policies that dictate many aspects of the automotive industry, 
regulation has proven to be insufficient on its own because its 
culture and limited resources all but prevent effective reactive 
measures.  Similarly, while litigation is an essential tool for 
individual victims seeking redress, it fails to directly encourage 
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consumer behavior and may not directly drive manufacturers’ 
conduct either. Finally, market forces may provide 
manufacturers with the best incentive to develop safety features, 
but the roots of this interest in safety are only as deep as 
consumers’ pockets. Based on these considerations, it is clear that 
there must be more than these three forces fueling the 
development of automotive safety technology. A brief 
examination of a few of the major automotive scandals of the last 
50 years may help shed some light on the elusive fourth element.   
As we first saw in the mid-1960s following the publication 
of Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed, the real force behind 
automotive safety is deeply rooted in the public perception.  
Ralph Nader was not the first person who tried to shame the 
manufacturers, but he was the loudest.  Once the public 
consciousness had been engaged, Congress was quick to begin 
developing the NHTSA, and courts broadened the duties 
imposed on the automakers. A decade later, Mark Dowie 
prompted a similar level of moral indignation from consumers 
when his article “Pinto Madness” was featured in the magazine 
Mother Jones. In the mid-1980s, the NHTSA launched an 
investigation into the complaints it had been receiving about 
sudden unintended acceleration in Audi sedans. Audi voluntarily 
added a brake transmission interlock, and the number of 
complaints quickly dropped off.79 According to the lead author of 
the NHTSA’s 1989 investigation, Robert Quinn Brackett, the 
agency dropped the matter entirely before pinpointing the exact 
cause of the acceleration or determining whether the brake 
interlock system could make other cars safer.  Bracket said: “The 
noise level dropped. The issue had moved on in terms of 
notoriety, which does drive research budgets.”80   
Toyota’s recent sudden unintended acceleration scandal is 
another perfect example. In March 2007, the NHTSA and Toyota 
first launched an investigation based on five complaints of 
jammed gas pedals in the 2007 Lexus ES350s.81 Following a fatal 
accident that July, the NHTSA required Toyota to recall 55,000 
floor mats and then closed the investigation.82 In a confidential 
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presentation to Toyota executives, the company estimated that it 
saved $100 million by negotiating with the regulators to limit the 
breadth of the recall. The two Toyota employees responsible for 
the company’s favorable outcome were former NHTSA 
employees.83 Similar incidents continued through 2008, including 
another fatality in a 2005 Camry that had not been included in 
the original recall, but nothing further was done.84 Then, on 
August 28, 2009, an off-duty highway patrol officer was traveling 
with his family in a 2007 Lexus ES350 when the pedal got 
stuck.85 A frantic 911 call recorded the passengers’ terror in the 
moments before they were killed.86 By mid-September the 
national media outlets latched onto the story, which was quickly 
becoming a major problem for Toyota. Approximately two weeks 
after the first national headline, Toyota announced on September 
29, 2009 that it would recall 3.8 million vehicles due to faulty 
floor mats.87 From these examples emerges a much clearer picture 
of the true force driving automotive safety: the media.88 
The pattern that has developed over the past 50 years is 
quite disturbing. Consistently, every 10 years the media identifies 
a major safety deficiency, outraged consumers change their 
buying habits, the manufacturers scramble to change some aspect 
of production, and politicians, salivating at the thought of stump 
speech consumer protection regulations, demand special hearings 
and draft new legislation. Unfortunately, the fervor with which 
the automakers and legislators respond endures only as long as 
the public pays attention. Once the media moves on, the 
legislation falls by the wayside and automakers let down their 
guard, allowing a new problem to take root. 
Recognizing the role of the media reveals the true 
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relationship of the three disparate forces that have each 
historically claimed primary responsibility for automotive safety. 
The picture that emerges is that each one has a specific strength 
that is indispensable to the overall development of automotive 
safety. First, litigation verifies individual complaints and creates 
incentives for attorneys and consultants to watch for early 
warnings and patterns and then to seek justice for victims. 
Second, the media uses the information collected by attorneys and 
legitimized by the courts to bring major safety concerns to the 
public’s attention. Finally, the sudden public awareness provides 
manufacturers with incentive to fix the problem before it affects 
the brand and consumer behavior.  
As we move forward with the hope of making preventable 
traffic fatalities a thing of the past, we need to use this new 
understanding to encourage each of these elements to work 
together and capitalize on the growing momentum behind new 
safety technology. By focusing on the individual strengths of 
these four elements, we may finally break the automotive defect 
scandal cycle and learn to correct problems before they result in 
serious injuries and fatalities. 
II.  THE FUTURE OF AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY 
TECHNOLOGY 
As a result of the 2010 Toyota sudden acceleration 
scandal, politicians drafted legislation aimed at broadening the 
powers of the NHTSA to prevent such a large-scale quality 
control crisis from reoccurring. Due to significant pushback from 
automakers and their lobbyists, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 
2010 died quietly at the end of the that Congressional session. 
The potential for a safer future on the road, however, has never 
been greater. 
With the annual number of traffic fatalities per vehicle 
mile traveled sharply declining, it is clear that the automotive 
safety is improving. While government programs designed to 
educate drivers and improve roadways have certainly 
contributed to this progress, it is the technology in the vehicles 
themselves that have the greatest potential to impact driver 
safety.89 
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Since the advent of the automobile, safety advocates 
including automakers have focused almost exclusively on passive 
safety features, but, historically, the primary cause of highway 
injuries and fatalities is not defects but rather some kind of driver 
error. Resigned to the belief that collisions were unavoidable 
“accidents,” safety advocates developed features, such as seat 
belts, crumple zones, anti-lock brakes and airbags, all of which 
were primarily aimed at ameliorating injuries rather than 
preventing them outright. Over the past several decades, major 
improvements have been made to provide safety systems like 
anti-lock brakes and electronic stability control, which when used 
together have proven to reduce fatalities dramatically.90 While 
these passive safety features will always be invaluable, safety 
advocates have begun to wonder whether there might be a better 
approach to making cars safer. 
Thanks to the recent advances in technology and 
telecommunications that have already saturated nearly every 
other aspect of our culture, a new way of thinking about 
automotive safety has emerged. This new approach rejects the 
old assumption that collisions were unavoidable. In this new era, 
automakers have the tools they need to begin introducing active 
safety features that finally address the real cause of most 
collisions—driver error. Examples of the active safety features 
that are currently on the market include lane departure warning 
systems, which can act as an in-car rumble strip to alert the 
driver when he or she is unintentionally leaving the roadway, 
driver alertness monitoring, which monitors eye orientation and 
activity, and side-object detection systems that alert drivers when 
another vehicle is in their blind spot. A recent study predicts that 
each of these features has the potential to reduce traffic fatalities 
by five to ten percent.91   
Currently, the consensus seems to be that drivers are 
better off having more safety features, as long as the dangers 
avoided outweigh the in-car distractions created by a single safety 
feature. This delicate balance hints at the massive problem posed 
by distracted drivers. According to the NHTSA, “5,780 people 
lost their lives and an estimated 515,000 people were injured in 
police-reported vehicle accidents in 2008 in which at least one 
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form of driver distraction was reported on the accident report.”92 
Because this is a detail that drivers are unlikely to divulge and 
police officers have a hard time knowing without being told, the 
true numbers are likely much higher. With these startling 
statistics in mind, as we look to improving highway safety over 
the next decade, eliminating driver distractions needs to be a 
major focus not just for auto manufacturers but also for 
regulators. 
Each automaker decides how these active safety features 
communicate the warnings to drivers, and therefore the delivery 
methods vary dramatically.93 Not surprisingly, Americans have 
reacted very negatively to these bells and whistles, and as a 
result, automakers try to balance useful alerts without making 
the driver feel any less in control of his or her vehicle.94 Methods 
of warning drivers vary from simple sounds to flashing lights and 
haptic feedback. For example, when a vehicle enters the blind 
zone of a Buick LaCrosse sedan, an amber light is illuminated on 
the driver’s side-view mirror.95  Some vehicles alert the driver by 
vibrating the steering wheel or tugging lightly on the seatbelt.96  
Other manufacturers have begun introducing features that go a 
step further and actually intervene on behalf of the driver. For 
example, when the Acura RL sedan recognizes that a crash is 
imminent and the driver is unresponsive to audio, visual, and 
tactile alerts, the car applies the brakes itself.97 In the current 
market, however, the sense among consumers is that there is a 
fine line between good safety features and annoying ones. To 
combat this, “most automakers are installing switches that allow 
drivers to deactivate” the more pervasive and unnecessary 
features.98 
These new active safety features are not only important 
because they save lives, but also because many of them address 
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issues that are likely to grow dramatically over the coming 
decades.  Americans are not only living longer these days, they’re 
also driving longer. According to census projections, by 2020 
there will be approximately 40 million licensed drivers over the 
age of 65 in the United States.99 Unfortunately, older drivers are 
at considerably greater risk of suffering from slower reaction 
times, diminished vision, and chronic health issues requiring 
medication that alters perception and alertness.100 Recognizing 
these risks, the American Medical Association, with support from 
the NHTSA, created the Physician’s Guide to Assessing and 
Counseling Older Drivers. Now in its second edition, this guide is 
crucial not just in helping physicians advise patients’ families 
about when it is time to stop driving, but also in educating older 
drivers that there are simple steps they can take to reduce their 
risk without having to give up their license altogether.101 
Active safety features are also important in counteracting 
the growing list of distractions that face today’s drivers. Some 
safety advocates caution that manufacturers are going overboard 
with hands-free technology, warning that, paradoxically, many of 
the tools offered under the auspices of mitigating distractions 
actually just create bigger ones. For example, in late 2010 General 
Motors announced that OnStar, the communications system 
already installed on many of its vehicles, would soon allow 
drivers to update their Facebook status using voice commands, as 
if the technology cannot distract a driver who has his or her 
hands free.102 John Capp, director of global active safety at 
General Motors, said: “As we put more of these features into 
vehicles, there’s always a risk of information overload or causing 
a distraction.”103 Some skeptics warn of a more troubling risk, 
“the offset hypothesis.” This hypothesis suggests that the 
proliferation of innovations intended to improve safety will cause 
drivers to be less vigilant themselves.104 Fortunately, some 
automakers are taking responsible steps to alleviate some of the 
distractions. Ford, for example, equips a growing number of their 
models with a “Do Not Disturb” button on the front console, 
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which blocks incoming calls and texts while the vehicle is 
moving.105 
Thanks to the media’s coverage of auto safety scandals 
and the public’s reactions, automakers are now taking a growing 
interest in the development of auto safety technology. Until 
recently, automakers invested significant sums of money in 
developing outlandish “concept cars” that purported to reveal 
where the brand saw itself a few decades in the future. The 
vehicles rarely bore any resemblance to the rest of the brands’ 
cars nor were they intended to predict future styles. Instead, these 
cars were merely publicity stunts, intended to make their 
otherwise-bland minivans, for example, seem part of a “cool” 
brand. When the recent downturn in the auto industry caused 
automakers to curtail their spending, many automakers realized 
that safety technology development offers a better bang for their 
buck and seem to be redirecting some of their design resources 
toward safety.  
As much as automakers are trying to build their brands 
around safety, they have not yet completely abandoned their long 
tradition of dragging their feet with respect to such features. In 
fact, it was the auto industry’s powerful lobbyists that killed the 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2010 by demanding countless 
revisions. Fortunately, the NHTSA has recognized both the 
potential these features have to mitigate fatalities and the 
importance of demanding that manufacturers uniformly comply. 
In an effort to promote new technology, for example, the NHTSA 
recently announced that manufacturers will be required to equip 
all cars with electronic stability control by 2012. In an effort to 
encourage automakers to adopt other features as well, under the 
new NCAP testing procedures unveiled in October 2010, only 
cars with collision warning and lane-departure alert systems were 
eligible for the coveted five-star safety rating in 2011.106 
It is through this long-term policy development that the 
NHTSA is most influential in developing safer automobiles. The 
NHTSA has never been as important as it is right now because 
the next automotive safety feature on the horizon will never work 
if it has nothing more than market forces to rely on. For example, 
car-to-car communications systems may eventually allow vehicles 
to broadcast their speed, location, and other key data to other 
vehicles nearby in order to help prevent crashes and generally 
                                                          
 105  LeGault, supra note 93, at 14. 
 106  Id. 
Gavin Article Final (Do Not Delete)  11/29/2012  12:29 PM 
2012 Crash Test Dummies 107 
improve the flow of traffic. Despite the obvious obstacles 
presented from a privacy perspective, auto manufacturers are 
already starting to develop and debate implementation. The 
problem, according to Volkswagen development chief Dr. Ulrich 
Hackenberg, is that there needs to be “a critical mass of 10% of 
all the vehicles on the road to be equipped before there are any 
benefits for customers.”107 Even if regulators mandate equipping 
every new vehicle with car-to-car communications technology, it 
would take at least five years before market saturation reached 
10%.108 In the meantime, manufacturers and consumers would be 
paying for technology that had little or no effect on their safety. 
Although already working on developing the technology, 
automakers disagree about whether regulators should require 
that all new cars have the technology.109 While some automakers 
opine that such regulation would help bring down costs and 
speed up the implementation process, other manufacturers warn, 
albeit less convincingly, that it may be detrimental to their overall 
safety development programs because it eliminates an incentive 
to compete.110 The unspoken concern among automakers is that 
such systems will likely create a vast new source of tort liability. 
III.  CONCLUSION: THE FULL-SIZE FUTURE OF THE 
SUBCOMPACT AUTOMOBILE 
The NHTSA’s real power, though rooted in its long-term 
policy-making, is not limited to making safety requirements. The 
NHTSA also wields enormous influence over the auto industry 
by setting the fuel efficiency standards. Until the 1973 OPEC 
crisis, gas prices had been consistently low enough that fuel 
economy was not a major concern for consumers considering 
buying a new car. Instead, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
American automobile companies were engaged in a full-scale 
horsepower war, with each new vehicle consuming more gas in 
order to produce more power.  Meanwhile, in Europe, higher gas 
prices, narrower roads, and more crowded cities provided 
consumers with a natural incentive to favor smaller cars. The gas 
shortage in the early 1970s, however, provided the U.S. with a 
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rude awakening regarding its dependence on gasoline.  In an 
effort to lessen the country’s vulnerability should another gas 
shortage hit, the NHTSA created the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) regulations in 1975 to guide manufacturers’ 
development of more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
Between 1978 and 1985, the fuel economy standards rose 
from 18 miles per gallon (mpg) to 27.5 mpg.111 With hybrid 
technology and lighter weight materials still decades away from 
being feasible, the only way to achieve better fuel economy was 
by selling more small and underpowered vehicles. In response to 
the new fuel standards, the Big Three American automakers, 
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, began developing 
subcompact cars, including the Ford Pinto. When gas prices 
returned to their normal levels, however, these automakers 
struggled to convince consumers to purchase these subcompact 
vehicles. As evidenced by the infamous Ford Pinto, the 
automakers stripped the subcompacts of all their luxuries so as to 
lower the price enough to generate sufficient demand. 
However, profit margins were still much larger on full-size 
vehicles, so over the next three decades, automakers developed 
lighter materials and more efficient engines, and applied them to 
their bigger vehicles. In other words, despite the great progress 
being made in fuel efficiency overall, average fuel economy 
stayed right at 27.5 mpg while cars resumed their pre-1973 rate of 
growth. The NHTSA allowed this trend by keeping the fuel 
economy standards at about 27.5 mpg from 1985 until 2005.112 
During this time, the average weight of an automobile increased 
by approximately 1,000 pounds and the average dimensions 
increased by approximately four inches in each direction.113 In 
addition, less stringent light truck fuel economy standards have 
caused manufacturers to market high profit margin vehicles such 
as the minivan and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) to populations 
that would otherwise have only bought a full-size car. Sadly, by 
not increasing their fuel economy standards to match the 
manufacturers’ technological progress, the NHTSA missed an 
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important opportunity to encourage the development of small 
cars and their safety components.  However, the NHTSA has 
taken important steps to change this.  In April 2011, the NHTSA 
announced that average fuel economy for each manufacturer 
must reach 35.5 mpg by 2016.114 In addition, the light truck 
segment, which accounted for approximately half of all 
automotive sales in the U.S. during the first eleven months of 
2010, will need to achieve 30 mpg.115 
With gas prices currently on the rise, it seems likely that in 
approximately 15 years, Americans will embrace the subcompact 
automobile to the same degree that such cars have been popular 
in Western Europe for decades.116 In order for this to happen, 
there are essentially three cultural shifts that need to take place to 
make subcompacts nearly replace all full-size cars and trucks that 
are nonessential to consumers’ work. First, rising gas prices will 
make bigger cars less desirable. Second, people will begin to see 
small cars as safer. New safety features are already making 
headway in this respect. More importantly, car-to-car 
communication systems that safety experts predict will begin to 
saturate the market in six to eight years may greatly diminish the 
possibility of an accident caused by another vehicle. Similarly, 
considering that these larger vehicles pose the greatest safety 
threat to small cars, subcompacts will also benefit from there 
being fewer SUVs and trucks on the road, which will help this 
shift develop momentum. Third, people will begin thinking about 
subcompacts as more than just bare-bones economy cars. In order 
for this third shift to take place, automakers will need to 
recognize that the optional equipment such as leather seats and 
navigation systems that buyers associate with “luxury vehicles” 
provide higher profit margins for subcompact cars and make 
                                                          
 114  Deepa Seetharaman, Meeting Fuel Standards Without Losing Brawn, 
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 2011, at 2. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Microcars such as the Smart car, on the other hand, are unlikely to 
become more popular in the United States in the foreseeable future. Like the 
subcompacts, they are popular in Europe because they take up very little room 
and achieve excellent fuel economy. Their only real distinction from 
subcompacts is that they are generally shorter in length, taller in height, and 
usually offer seating for no more than two people and virtually no cargo area. 
Considering the U.S. does not face overcrowding issues to the same degree 
Europe does, even as the subcompact’s popularity rises and ameliorates some 
of the safety concerns surrounding the microcar’s inherently light and tight 
construction, the car’s slightly smaller footprint will not sufficiently offset its 
striking lack of utility. 
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them more desirable to consumers as well.  
The good news is that all three of these trends have begun 
to occur. When gas prices peaked a few years ago, many 
automakers realized their supply of small cars was inadequate. 
Many automakers temporarily boosted production levels, and 
also began developing new subcompact vehicles that are only 
now coming to market as gas prices are again increasing. Second, 
in addition to the safety features that are expected in the next 
decade, other major steps have been made to rid the roads of the 
threat-posing larger vehicles. The Car Allowance Rebate System 
that ran in July and August 2009, also known as the Cash-for-
Clunkers program, had a major impact on the number of larger 
vehicles on the road. Nearly 700,000 “clunkers” with an average 
fuel economy of 15.8 miles per gallon were traded in during this 
program, and consumers opted for new cars that were generally 
smaller and 58% more fuel efficient than the vehicles they traded 
in.117 Furthermore, the NHTSA recently raised its fuel economy 
standards, providing manufacturers with a very compelling 
reason to sell more subcompacts in order to meet those tough fuel 
economy standards. 
While full-size sedans and trucks are currently seen as the 
safest vehicles on the road, their safety status comes from the 
comparative advantages they have over small cars. Considering 
that fuel prices and CAFE fuel economy standards are likely to 
necessitate smaller and lighter cars in the coming decade, the 
move to a more ubiquitous use of subcompact vehicles would be 
a strong step in the right direction for automotive safety in the 
United States. As this note discussed, however, there are many 
components that must continue to work in unison for the 
optimum safety level to be reached. Regulations must continue to 
be monitored, especially as new technologies and safety standards 
are developed. In the event that manufacturers aren’t responding 
fast enough to regulatory mandates or public demand, litigation 
can speed the process of reform. For each of these factors to work, 
the media must maintain a vigilant eye on the design updates 
made to vehicles so that informed consumers can make the 
necessary demands if not decisions to litigate. These factors must 
be taken together to drive automotive design in the U.S. to even 
greater levels of safety.  
                                                          
 117  Press Release, Department of Transportation, Cash For Clunkers 
Wraps Up with Nearly 700,000 Car Sales and Increased Fuel Efficiency (Aug. 
26, 2009) available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2009/dot13309.htm.  
